Select Page

El Faro sinking : The Coast Guard today released the Final Action Memo regarding the loss of the S.S. El Faro and its 33 crewmembers during a 2015 hurricane near Crooked Island, Bahamas.

In the Final Action Memo, Commandant of the Coast Guard, Adm. Paul Zukunft, approves the findings of fact, analysis, and conclusions detailed in the Marine Board of Investigation’s Report of Investigation, essentially marking it as the official Coast Guard position on the cause of the marine casualty.

Following the Commandant’s review of the ROI and comments received from Parties in Interest and families of the crew, he concluded that the primary cause of the casualty was the decision to navigate El Faro too close to the path of Hurricane Joaquin. Contributing factors include: (1) an ineffective safety management system within the operating company, TOTE Services, Incorporated; (2) American Bureau of Shipping’s failures to uncover or otherwise resolve longstanding deficiencies that adversely affected the safety and seaworthiness of vessels on multiple occasions; and (3) failure of the Coast Guard to adequately oversee the third party in this case, and the investigation reveals that the Coast Guard has not sustained the proficiency and policy framework to do so in general. Read more

Read also: http://topintelligencereport.com/security-stability-korean-peninsula/

The Coast Guard today released the Final Action Memo regarding the loss of the S.S. El Faro and its 33 crewmembers during a 2015 hurricane near Crooked Island, Bahamas.

In the Final Action Memo, Commandant of the Coast Guard, Adm. Paul Zukunft, approves the findings of fact, analysis, and conclusions detailed in the Marine Board of Investigation’s Report of Investigation, essentially marking it as the official Coast Guard position on the cause of the marine casualty.

Following the Commandant’s review of the ROI and comments received from Parties in Interest and families of the crew, he concluded that the primary cause of the casualty was the decision to navigate El Faro too close to the path of Hurricane Joaquin. Contributing factors include: (1) an ineffective safety management system within the operating company, TOTE Services, Incorporated; (2) American Bureau of Shipping’s failures to uncover or otherwise resolve longstanding deficiencies that adversely affected the safety and seaworthiness of vessels on multiple occasions; and (3) failure of the Coast Guard to adequately oversee the third party in this case, and the investigation reveals that the Coast Guard has not sustained the proficiency and policy framework to do so in general.